\uc774 \uae00\uc740 \ud1b5\uc77c\uc744 \ub300\ube44\ud55c \uc11c\ub3c5\uc758 \uacbd\ud5d8\uc744 \ud55c\uad6d\uc758 \uc0ac\ub840\uc640 \ube44\uad50 \ubd84\uc11d\ud55c \ub0b4\uc6a9\uc73c\ub85c 1960\ub144\ub300 \ub9d0\ubd80\ud130 1970\ub144\ub300 \ucd08\uc5d0 \uac78\uccd0 \ud3bc\uccd0\uc9c4 \ub3c5\uc77c\uc758 ‘\uc2e0(\u65b0) \ub3d9\ubc29 \uc815\ucc45(Neue Ostpolitik\ub178\uc774\uc5d0 \uc624\uc2a4\ud2b8\ud3f4\ub9ac\ud2f1)’ \uae30\uac04 \ub3d9\uc548\uc758 \ub3c5\uc77c \ud1b5\uc77c\uc900\ube44 \uacbd\ud5d8 \ubd84\uc11d\uc744 \ud1b5\ud574 \ud55c\uad6d\uc5d0\uc758 \ud568\uc758\ub97c \ub3c4\ucd9c\ud55c\ub2e4. \uc2e0(\u65b0) \ub3d9\ubc29 \uc815\ucc45’\uc740 1969\ub144 \uc120\uac70\ub85c \uc11c\ub3c5 \ucd5c\ucd08\ub85c \uc0ac\ud68c\ubbfc\uc8fc\ub2f9-\uc790\uc720\ubbfc\uc8fc\ub2f9 \uc5f0\ud569\uc815\ubd80\uac00 \ucd9c\ubc94\ud558\uba74\uc11c \uc2e4\uc2dc\ub41c \uc815\ucc45\uc774\ub2e4. \uc0c8\ub85c\uc774 \ucd9c\ubc94\ud55c \uc9c4\ucde8\uc801\uc778 \uc11c\ub3c5 \uc815\ubd80\ub294 \uc8fc\ubcc0 \uad6d\uac00\ub4e4\uc778 \ub3d9\ub3c5, \ud3f4\ub780\ub4dc, \uccb4\ucf54\uc2ac\ub85c\ubc14\ud0a4\uc544, \uadf8\ub9ac\uace0 \uad6c\uc18c\ub828\uacfc\uc758 \uad00\uacc4\ub97c \uac1c\uc120\ud558\uace0\uc790 \ud558\uc600\ub2e4. 1969\ub144\ubd80\ud130 1974\ub144\uae4c\uc9c0 \ub3c5\uc77c\uc758 \uc218\uc0c1\uc774\uc5c8\ub358 \ub3c5\uc77c \uc0ac\ud68c\ubbfc\uc8fc\ub2f9\uc758 Willy Brandt\uc640 \uadf8\uc758 \ud2b9\ubcc4 \uace0\ubb38\uad00\uc778 Egon Bahr\uac00 \uc8fc\ub3c4\ud588\ub358 \uc774 \uc815\ucc45\uc740 \uad81\uadf9\uc801\uc73c\ub85c \ub0c9\uc804\uc758 \uc885\uacb0\uacfc 1990\ub144 \ub3c5\uc77c \ud1b5\uc77c\uc5d0 \uae30\uc5ec\ud558\uc600\ub2e4. \uc774 \uae00\uc5d0\uc11c\ub294 \uc9c0\uc815\ud559\uc801 \uc774\ub860\uc5d0 \uadfc\uac70\ud558\uc5ec \uc11c\ub3c5 \uc815\uce58\uc778\ub4e4\uc774 \uc5b4\ub5bb\uac8c \uad6c\uc18c\ub828\uacfc\uc758 \uad00\uacc4\ub97c \uac1c\uc120\ud558\uace0, \uc8fc\ubcc0\uad6d\ub4e4\uacfc\uc758 \uc2e0\ub8b0 \uad6c\ucd95\uc744 \ud1b5\ud574 \uc815\uce58\uc801\u2219\uacbd\uc81c\uc801 \uc2e4\uc775\uc744 \ud68d\ub4dd\ud588\ub294\uc9c0\ub97c \uc124\uba85\ud55c\ub2e4. \uc774\ub97c \ud1b5\ud55c \ub0a8\u00b7\ubd81\ud55c \uac04\uc758 \uc0ac\ub840\uc5d0 \uc8fc\ub294 \uc2dc\uc0ac\uc810\uc73c\ub85c\uc11c, \ud55c\uad6d\uc758 \uc815\ucc45 \uacb0\uc815\uc790\ub4e4\uc740 \uc911\uad6d, \ub7ec\uc2dc\uc544, \ubbf8\uad6d \ub4f1 \uac15\ub300\uad6d\ub4e4\uc758 \uc9c0\uc815\ud559\uc801\u00b7 \uc804\ub7b5\uc801\uc778 \uc774\ud574\uad00\uacc4\ub97c \ud1b5\ucc30\ud568\uacfc \ub3d9\uc2dc\uc5d0, \ud55c\uad6d \uc2a4\uc2a4\ub85c \uc790\uc2e0\uc758 \uc804\ub7b5\uc801 \ucc98\uc9c0\ub97c \uac1c\uc120\ud560 \uc218 \uc788\ub3c4\ub85d \uac15\ub300\uad6d\ub4e4\uacfc\uc758 \uae34\ubc00\ud55c \uad00\uacc4\ub97c \uad6c\ucd95\ud558\uace0, \uc5ec\ud0c0 \uc911\uacac\uad6d\uac00\ub4e4\uc758 \ucc38\uc5ec\ub97c \uc720\ub3c4\ud558\uc5ec \uc0c1\ud638\uc801\uc73c\ub85c \uc544\uc2dc\uc544 \ub0b4\uc758 \uc548\ubcf4 \uac15\ud654\uc5d0 \ud798\uc4f0\uae30\ub97c \uc81c\uc5b8\ud558\uace0\uc790 \ud55c\ub2e4.<\/p>\n
This article provides a comparative analysis of the West German experience with preparing for national unification during the \u2018New Eastern Policy\u2019 (Neue Ostpolitik) in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which came about due to the 1969 election of West Germany\u2019s first ever social liberal coalition government. The new progressive government was keen to improve the relationship of West Germany with its eastern neighbors, namely East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and, last but not least, the Soviet Union. This policy initiative is primarily associated with social democratic chancellor Willy Brandt (1969-1974) and his special advisor Egon Bahr. It ultimately contributed to the closure of the Cold War and German reunification in 1990. Building on geopolitical theory, the article explains how West German politicians managed to realize political and economic gains by improving the relationship with the Soviet Union and by engaging in confidence-building measures with other neighboring countries. Turning to the North and South Korean cases, it is suggested that geostrategic interests of the great powers \u2013 China, Russia and the U.S. \u2013 must be accommodated by South Korean policymakers, while they can improve their own strategic positioning vis-\u00e0-vis greater powers by building close inter-Korean relations and by inviting other middle powers to participate in efforts to strengthen mutual security in Asia.<\/p>\n
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